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Commodity taxes play an important role in Brazil and raise around 60% of the total tax revenue. This 
heavy reliance renders commodity taxation one of the main tools available to the government for raising 
revenue and securing redistribution. In fact, Brazilian income inequity is one of the highest in the world: 
the wealthiest 1% of population, equivalent to 1.6 million people, earn together as much as the 50% 
poorest, around 80 million.  
The purpose of this paper is a partial equilibrium numerical simulation of the distributional effects of 
optimal commodity taxation combined with minimum income transfers made by the government to 
households. The approach used to measure households welfare is a money metric indirect utility or 
´equivalent income` [King (1983)], that underlies the Almost Ideal Demand System parameters. We plug 
it into the equivalent variation measure to evaluate the equity effects specified in terms of the equivalent 
income. The data source is a 1995/1996 national household expenditure survey, though estimated 
parameters come from a sample comprising a 1987/88 wave as well. 
We find that our proposed minimum income programs combined with selectiveness in commodity tax 
structure would be useful as redistribution income instrument among households in Brazil. These results 
can provide some valuable contribution in the context of the increasing discussion about minimum 
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1. Introduction 
The Brazilian tax system as a whole is extremely complex and generates production and 
consumption distortions. Commodity taxes play an important role in the country and raise 
around 60% of the total tax revenue. This heavy reliance renders commodity taxation a subject 
of considerable policy importance and one of the main tools available to the government for 
raising revenue and securing redistribution. In fact, Brazilian income inequity is one of the 
highest in the world: 1% of the wealthiest, equivalent to 1.6 million people, earn together as 
much as the 50% poorest, around 80 million. Moreover, absolute poverty reaches around one 
third of the population with a standard of living under basic necessities. Therefore, an analysis 
of optimal commodity taxes combined with income transfers in Brazil and its impact in income 
distribution is of utmost importance. 
There has been an increasing debate on the use of minimum income programs as a consistent 
social policy measure to cope with this problem. In particular, the Bolsa-Escola is a good 
example of a cash transfer program targeted to low-income families with children. This 
program, where eligibility is conditioned to school frequency by the dependents at school age, 
has shown good results both in terms of focus and coverage in the cities of Brasilia, Campinas, 
Belem and Belo Horizonte. As from April of 2001, the federal government has been 
implementing ‘Bolsa-Escola’, covering nearly 98% of the 5,561 municipalities in the country. 
It should be noted that, besides ‘Bolsa-Escola’, there are other cash transfer programs in 
Brazil that varies from the eligibility criteria to the target population. Some of them are the 
following:  i) Pensions, for which entitlement is based on contributions made to the social 
security system; ii) Unemployment Benefit, as long as the worker has not resigned nor been laid 
off for fair reasons; iii) a family allowance paid for all children less than 14 years old or 
disabled of any age to employees and temporary workers who earn less than near two minimum 
wages; iv) ‘Bolsa Alimentação’ which is a transfer targeted to pregnant women and to children 
aged from 6 months to 6 years. 
1 
Optimal commodity tax systems elicit the conflict between efficiency and equity concerns in 
the design of commodity taxes that raise required revenue and obtain given distribution 
objectives, at the lowest cost in terms of efficiency. Optimal tax models can be solved under 
alternative assumptions regarding: the government’s concern with inequality; household 
preferences; required government revenue level; and constraints on its ability to tax. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the distributional effects of optimal commodity 
taxation combined with minimum income programs in Brazil. Our analysis is restricted to a 
partial equilibrium treatment and focuses on the effects of alternative optimal commodity tax 
systems, combined with income transfers, on the economic welfare of different income classes 
of household. We extend our previous work (see Asano, Barbosa and Fiuza [forthcoming]) by 
allowing for an income transfer to be made by the government according to households’ 
demographic characteristics such as the number of children at school age in lower income 
households (following ‘Bolsa-Escola’ features). Our benchmark is a more generalized program 
in which the government combines an optimal commodity taxation system and a uniform lump 
sum income transfer made only to the lower income households. 
The approach used to measure household’s welfare is a money metric indirect utility, in 
some contexts also referred to as ‘equivalent income’ and introduced by King (1983). Welfare 
                                                 
1 Most of these programs still remain after the new Federal government was established in office in 
January 2003. Recent announcements released by the press indicate that there will be some changes 
towards unifying the various cash transfer programs, but the debate has not settled yet.    3 
effects simulations are based on the equivalent variation concept specified in terms of the 
equivalent income that underlies the Almost Ideal Demand System parameters (Almost Ideal 
Demand System, by Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). The data source is a 1995/1996 national 
household expenditure survey, though estimated parameters come from a sample comprising a 
1987/88 wave as well. 
The analysis of the extent to which distributional goals can be reached in Brazil through 
commodity taxes, within an optimal taxation framework, has already been considered in 
Siqueira (1997). Her model employed the equivalent measure of consumer surplus to estimate 
the effects of alternative tax structures on the welfare of households. The tax structures varied 
from a system with two rates of value added tax (VAT), in addition to zero rate on food, 
combined with excise duties on alcoholic beverages and tobacco to a tax system with a 
proportional value added tax on all goods. She also considered the case that in addition to an 
optimal commodity tax structure the government made a uniform lump sum payment to all 
households. Siqueira’s results indicated that a tax system based on two or three rates of VAT, 
plus some food subsidies and/or direct income support for certain household groups, and 
supplemented by excise on luxury goods, could effectively improve social welfare and advance 
the objective of greater equity. The household demand pattern in Siqueira’s model was a Linear 
Expenditure System (LES) and the data source was ENDEF (Estudo Nacional de Despesas 
Familiares), a comprehensive survey undertaken from August 1974 to August 1975 in all 
metropolitan and urban areas, and rural areas in the Southern, Southeastern and Northeastern 
regions. 
Sah (1983) considered the use of commodity taxation and subsidies in order to improve the 
welfare of the worst-off individual, based on U.K. data. He obtained an upper limit in terms of 
the maximum budget share of the worst-off as a ratio of the minimum average share in the 
economy. The results point out to inadequacy of commodity taxation as a redistributive 
instrument. Nevertheless, in the Indian case, Majumder (1988), contrary to Ray (1986), found 
out that the possibility of commodity taxes acting as a major source of redistribution cannot be 
ruled out. Creedy (1999) presented an empirical analysis of the welfare effects of several 
indirect tax reforms in Australia. Emphasis was placed on the implications for selected 
household types. When looking at all households combined, the results suggested that 
redistribution through possible tax reforms is small. Creedy argues that these results conceal 
differences between different household types. Comparisons among several types of households 
show that the largest welfare losses are experienced by low total expenditure couples with one 
child while the smallest losses accrue to high total expenditure couples with two children and 
low total expenditure single person retired households.
2 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce the approach to measure 
the welfare impacts of the alternative tax systems. We also present the demand specification of 
the model with the empirical results regarding mean shares and elasticities from the AIDS 
estimation.  Section III presents optimal commodity tax structure when the only tax policy 
instrument available to the government is commodity taxation. It also shows optimal 
commodity tax structures combined with different income transfer schemes and presents our 
methodology to simulate the welfare impacts on households under these programs. Section IV 
describes the data used for the simulations. The results regarding the impact on household 
welfare are discussed in section V and we sum up with the concluding remarks of section VI. 
                                                 
2Although some of these studies do use an optimal commodity tax framework, none of them applied the 
same methodology as ours.    4 
2. The Model 
2.1 Welfare Changes Measure 
The method of measuring the welfare and distributional effects on different households of 
alternative commodity tax reforms uses the Hicksian concept of the ‘equivalent variation’. This 
is defined using the expenditure function, E(p,U), which represents the minimum amount of 
income required to achieve a given utility level U at prices p. The equivalent variation, EV, is: 




0)         (2.1) 
We assume that there are H households in the economy indexed by h. Savings is not 
included in the model, so income and total expenditure are treated as synonymous. In the pre-
reform position household h faces a vector of prices p
0. The term E(p
0,U
0) is the total 
expenditure before the price change, denoted by y0. After the reform the household faces a new 
price vector p
1. Suppose that the price vector changes from p
0 to p
1, and that U
1 represents the 
post-change utility.  The equivalent variation is, therefore, the amount the household would be 
willing to pay, in the new situation, to avoid the price change. 
Following King (1983), we use a money metric measure known as ‘equivalent income’. This 
is defined as the value of income, ye, that at some reference set of prices, pr, gives the same 
utility function as the actual income level. In terms of the indirect utility function, ye is therefore 
defined by V(pr, ye) = V(p, y). If we use the expenditure function we have ye = E(pr, V(p, y)). 
When pre-change prices, p




2.2 Demand Specification 
We assume that the preferences and household demand patterns are based on the Almost 
Ideal Demand System – AIDS, proposed by Deaton & Muellbauer (1980). This system has 
desirable properties and provides a flexible approximation to the consumer preference structure. 
The AIDS expenditure function is given by: 
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The linear homogeneity of the expenditure function with respect to the price vector requires 
the following constraints: 
**
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By applying Shephard’s lemma to (2.2), we obtain the share equations:   5 
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y ∑                 i = 1,.., n. (2.5) 
where w
h
i  is the expenditure share of good i for individual h; pj is the price of good j (j=1,..,n); 
y
h is total expenditure. Hereafter, we drop superscript h, for the sake of simplicity in exposition. 
The price index is a non-linear price function represented by P: 
log log ( ) Pa = p
          
(2.6) 
Under (2.4), adding up constraints and homogeneity of the demand functions, corresponding 
to (2.5), are all satisfied. The expenditure function in (2.2) represents the minimal amount of 
income necessary to achieve a given level of utility U at prices p. The parameter α0 can be 
interpreted as the subsistence expenditure when all prices are normalized to one. 
The model defined by equations (2.5) and (2.6) is the Almost Ideal Demand System - AIDS 
(Deaton and Muellbauer [1980]). Also, the AIDS expenditure elasticities are given by: 
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It follows that if βi is negative the ith group is a necessity, and if βi is positive it is a luxury. 
Inverting the expenditure function, we obtain the AIDS indirect utility function: 
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(2.8) 
The value of the AIDS indirect utility function lies between 0 and 1, and its monotonic 
transformation can be used as a welfare measure. 
The AIDS parameters, used in our indirect utility function, were estimated by Asano and 
Fiuza (2001). The model incorporates demographic variables into the share equations, in the 
following form: 
log log( / )
hh h
ii i j j i i k k jk wp Y P Z αγ β ω =+ + + ∑∑             i = 1,..,n.   (2.9) 
where  Zk’s (k = 1,..,K)  are demographic variables, such as family size, education of the 
household heads, etc. Underlying to this extension is an adaptation of the subsistence level to 
incorporate demographic variables: 
0
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2.3 Shares and Elasticities 
The analysis of the impact of different tax systems on household’s welfare requires 
considerable information about the preferences and demand patterns of households. This section 
provides some useful information about the mean budget shares and the (expenditure) 
elasticities for sample used in the AIDS estimation.
3 
Table I presents the mean expenditure and own price elasticities for 1996. Total expenditure 
elasticities (a proxy for income elasticities) indicate that food and housing are the only 
necessities in Brazilian utility functions, whereas furnishings, clothing, transportation, health 
care and personal expenses are found to be luxuries.  The own-price elasticities are found to be 
significantly negative. Among them, those for food, housing and furnishings are significantly 
less than one (own-price inelastic), while clothing, transportation and communication, health 














                                                 
3 See section 4 for more information about the data sources used in AIDS estimation and in welfare 
simulations.   7 
 
Table I 
Mean Expenditure and Price Elasticities, 1996 
Expd.  Food  Hous Furn Clth Tran Hlth  Pers  Exp 
Shares  0.311 0.142 0.065 0.063 0.185 0.080  0.156 
Elasticity  0.712 0.818 1.316 1.184 1.270 1.097  1.164 
(s.e.)  (  0.030)  (  0.043)  (  0.104)  (  0.122)  (  0.069)  (  0.068)  (  0.055) 
Price Elasticities         
  Food  Hous Furn Clth Tran Hlth  Pers  Exp 
Food  -0.558  0.129 0.029 0.002 0.259 0.024  0.116 
(t-value)  ( -4.284)  -2.622 (  0.723) (  0.019)  -3.841 (  0.322) -2.131 
Hous  0.283  -0.778  0.057 0.092 0.114 0.189  0.043 
(t-value)  -3.131  ( -11.539)  -1.428 -1.682 -1.496 -3.715  (  0.877) 
Furn  0.137 0.124  -0.688  0.034 0.053 0.080  0.260 
(t-value)  ( 0.726)  -1.270  ( -6.332)  ( 0.294)  ( 0.335)  ( 0.783)  -2.369 
Clth  0.008 0.208 0.036  -1.112  0.475 -0.010 0.396 
(t-value)  ( 0.019)  -1.146  ( 0.293)  ( -1.932)  -2.150 (  -0.026)  -1.546 
Tran  0.435 0.087 0.019 0.162  -0.967  0.087 0.176 
(t-value)  -3.819 -1.368  (  0.336) -2.361  ( -6.747)  -1.380 -2.506 
Hlth  0.092 0.337 0.065  -0.008 0.203  -1.004  0.315 
(t-value)  ( 0.343)  -2.423  ( 0.830)  ( -0.026)  -1.556  ( -3.581)  -2.088 
Pers Exp  0.232 0.040 0.109 0.160 0.209 0.161  -0.910 
(t-value)  -2.445  (  0.872) -2.841 -2.996 -2.825 -3.047  ( -13.653) 
Source: Asano e Fiuza (2001). 
 
3. Optimal Commodity Tax Systems and Income Transfers 
 
Optimal tax models feature the maximization of a social welfare function, subject to a 
balanced government budget requirement. The trade-off between equity and efficiency is taken 
into account by introducing the government’s aversion to inequality into the social welfare 
function. 
This section presents alternative tax structures based on optimal commodity taxes and 
uniform income transfers calculated in Asano, Barbosa and Fiuza [forthcoming]. We present 
an extension of these optimal commodity tax structures in which we allow for a per capita 
payment to be made by the government only to the lower income households. The case which 
optimal commodity taxation is combined with a minimum income program directed to low-
income households with children of age from 6 to 15 enrolled in public elementary schools 
(‘Bolsa-Escola’) is also presented. 
 
3.1 Optimal Tax Rates and Uniform Transfers 
Table II presents three cases of optimal commodity tax structures for seven groups of 
commodities. They are: 1.FOOD; 2.HOUS (Housing); 3.FURN (furnishings); 4.CLOTH (clothing);   8 
5.TRANS  (transportation and communication); 6.HLTH  (health and  personal care) and 
7.PERS_EXP (personal expenses, education and reading). 
The tax rates and lump sum subsidies are presented for two different levels of inequality 
aversion (ε = 0.25 and ε = 2.00). This approach explicitly allows for the introduction of 
alternative value judgments from the government. Needless to say that for high levels of ε (in 
our case when ε = 2.00), the government has a stronger commitment to equity. We assume that 
the government revenue corresponds to 10% of the consumer’s total expenditure. 
 
Table II 
OPTIMAL TAX RATES (%) AND UNIFORM LUMP SUM TRANSFERS 
COMMODITY C ASE I CASE II CASE III 
GROUP  ε = 0.25  ε = 2.00  ε = 0.25  ε = 2.00  ε = 0.25  ε = 2.00 
1. FOOD  12.2% -29%  174.29%  301,77%  21.12%  -18.44% 
2. HOUSING  11.5% -10%  124.11%  215,85%  18.48%  1.43% 
3. FURN  8.1%  27.3%  29.07% 20.62% 10.22% 22.04% 
4. CLOTH  10.2%  35.9%  50.47% 73.47% 13.53% 34.29% 
5. TRANS  11.4%  53.1%  57.83% 95.29% 15.16% 50.67% 
6. HLTH  10.8%  36.8%  60.68% 96.74% 14.76% 36.71% 
7.PERS_EXP  10.9%  53%  50.09% 78.99% 14.28% 50.14% 
        
LUMP SUM TRANSFER  - -  1762.87  2971.56  127.19  124.19 
In R$ Sep 1996        
Note: in Case III, lump sum transfers are constrained with a binding ceiling equivalent to 50% of the 
minimum observed income in 1996 (source: Asano, Barbosa and Fiuza [forthcoming ]). 
Case I presents tax rates based on the assumption that the only tax policy instrument 
available to the government is consumption goods and services taxation. When ε = 0.25, the 
optimal commodity tax structure shows a movement towards uniformity.
4 However, for ε = 
2.00, when redistribution objectives are higher, there is a selectiveness in tax rates. In particular, 
food and housing groups are subsidized and the tax rates for the other groups increase 
significantly. 
Case II reports tax rates for the situation when the government, in addition to commodity 
taxes, sets an optimal uniform per-capita lump sum payment to all households. This payment 
works as a universal benefit uniform to all households. The main results for this case are the 
strikingly high levels of commodity tax rates and optimal lump sum subsidies for all levels of 
inequality aversion parameters. 
In Case III we show optimal tax rates combined with a constraint in the optimal lump sum 
transfer (obtained in the last case). The constraint is equal to 50% of the minimum observed 
income (we call it as ‘bonus rate’ = 0.5). The results show higher tax rates (and lower subsidies) 
than Case I and lower values of lumps sum transfers (than case II), which remains stable for 
both values of inequality aversion ε = 0.25 and ε = 2.00. 
                                                 
4 When ε is near zero, there is no concern for inequality. In this situation, a uniform rate of tax on all 
goods is equivalent to a tax on labor alone. This corresponds to the conventional prescription if there is a 
completely inelastic factor, this should bear all the tax (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972). Therefore, as Asano, 
Barbosa and Fiuza [forthcoming] assumed that labor supply is completely inelastic, the optimal 
commodity tax rate structure is uniform. 
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3.2 Transfers to the Lower Income Households 
We also extend our analysis by allowing for a per capita payment to be made by the 
government only to the lower income households. This income transfer is also a universal 
benefit but, different from case III, it is restricted only to the poorer households. We assume that 
this minimum income policy guarantees that each household gets 50% of the minimum wage 
per capita. So if the household already earns that income or more, he gets no transfer. This 




OPTIMAL TAX RATES (%) AND TRANSFERS TO 
LOWER INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (CASE IV) 
COMMODITY  ε = 0.25  ε = 2.00 
GROUP    
    
1. FOOD  11.01% -23.51% 
2. HOUSING  10.57% -4.08% 
3. FURN  7.73% 25.69% 
4. CLOTH  9.65% 30.47% 
5. TRANS  10.84% 35.40% 
6. HLTH  10.25% 30.78% 
7.PERS_EXP  10.39% 38.76% 
    
TRANSFERS (PER-CAPITA)*  R$ 672.00  R$ 672.00 
In R$ Sep 1996     
*half of the minimum wage per year. 
 
The commodity tax structure shown in Table III is quite similar to Cases I and III presented 
in Table II. For low value of inequality aversion parameter (ε = 0.25), the commodity groups 
that are more price inelastic, food and housing, high tax rates in comparison to the situation 
when there is a stronger commitment to redistribution objectives (ε = 2.00). In this case, both 
items are subsidized. As regards the other commodities, there is a significant increase in their 
tax rates when the inequality aversion increases. 
One important feature to stress in the results presented in table III is that even when the 
minimum income policy is introduced, a subsidy for food and housing is needed to improve 
welfare. Therefore, we conclude that introduction of transfers to lower households may still 
gives some room to commodity taxation as a redistribution instrument. This subject is analyzed 
in section 4. 
3.3. Optimal Commodity Tax Rates combined with ‘Bolsa-Escola’ 
The ‘Bolsa-Escola federal’ program was introduced in 2001 by the federal government. It 
came out as an unfolding of a previous federal minimum income program – Programa de 
Garantia de Renda Mínima (PGRM), which lasted two years (1998/2000 period). The target 
population of ‘Bolsa-Escola Federal’ low-income households with children of age from 6 to 15 
enrolled in public elementary schools. The eligibility criteria of ‘Bolsa-Escola federal’ is the 
students’ minimum school attendance of 85% and that households must have a per-capita 
income of maximum 50% of minimum wage. The income benefits are R$ 15.00 per child, with 
a constraint to R$45.00 per household.   10 
Following the characteristics of ‘Bolsa-Escola federal’, we also extend our analysis by 
allowing for a per capita payment to be made by the government only to the lower income 
households with children of age from 6 to 15. The income transfer is equal to R$15.00 per child 
and it is constrained to R$45.00 per household. This program is a more specific minimum 
income policy than the one presented in section 3.2 (case IV), in the sense that the latter has a 
larger target population than this one. Optimal commodity tax structures in this case are quite 
similar to the ones obtained in case IV presented in table III, for both values of inequality 
aversion parameter (ε = 0.25 and ε = 2.00). Table IV displays the optimal tax rates for the case 
in which income benefits are associated to ‘Bolsa-Escola’ program (case V). 
Table IV 
OPTIMAL TAX RATES (%) AND ‘BOLSA-ESCOLA’  
(CASE V) 
COMMODITY  ε = 0.25  ε = 2.00 
GROUP    
1. FOOD  12.26% -28.68% 
2. HOUSING  11.56% -9.80% 
3. FURN  8.06% 26.76% 
4. CLOTH  10.15% 35.47% 
5. TRANS  11.40% 52.65% 
6. HLTH  10.83% 36.47% 
7.PERS_EXP  10.90% 52.53% 
TRANSFERS (PER-CHILD)*  R$ 145.20  R$ 145.20 
In R$ Sep 1996     
*this value, R$145.20, represents the income benefit per year 
in 2001, R$ 180.00, adjusted for inflation to September,1996. 
 
We choose to increase the benefit value of ‘Bolsa-Escola’ in order to have a higher 
distributional impact. Therefore, we increase the income benefits regarding ‘Bolsa-Escola 
Federal’ to R$ 22,50 and R$30.00 per child, in R$ 2001 terms (1.5 and 2 of the federal value 
benefit, respectively). This increase in the income transfer generated an optimal commodity tax 
rates structure quite similar to the previous ‘Bolsa-Escola’ case presented in table IV. Optimal 
commodity tax rates for the higher benefits values are presented in table V. 
Table V 
OPTIMAL TAX RATES (%) AND CONSTRAINED ‘BOLSA-ESCOLA’  
(CASE VI) 
COMMODITY  ε = 0.25  ε = 2.00  ε = 0.25  ε = 2.00 
GROUP        
  1.5 X FEDERAL VALUE 2  X FEDERAL VALUE 
1. FOOD  12.30% -28.52%  12.32%  -28.05% 
2. HOUSING  11.58% -9.68%  11.59%  -9.35% 
3. FURN  8.05% 26.49%  8.44%  25.75% 
4. CLOTH  10.15% 35.29%  10.14%  34.77% 
5. TRANS  11.39% 52.39%  11.39%  51.64% 
6. HLTH  10.83% 36.32%  10.82%  35.91% 
7.PERS_EXP  10.89% 52.28%  10.88%  51.57% 
TRANSFERS (PER-CHILD)*  R$ 217.80  R$ 217.80  R$ 290.40  R$ 290.40 
In R$ Sep 1996         
*all values represent the income benefit per year in 2001, adjusted for inflation to September,1996.   11 
4.Data 
The AIDS parameters are obtained from Asano and Fiuza (2001).  The estimation of the 
demand system was based on family-level expenditure data for seven consumption categories 
and their corresponding price indexes: food; housing; furnishings; clothing; transportation and 
communication; health and personal care and personal expenses, education and reading. 
The data sources for expenditures are two waves of national expenditure surveys conducted 
in 1987/88 and 1995/96, and sources for price indexes are the monthly national survey 
consumer prices. Corresponding price indexes were constructed in a way to allow a comparison 
of prices both across periods and regions. The regions surveyed are the metropolitan areas of 
São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Belém, Fortaleza, Salvador 
and Curitiba, besides the cities of Brasilia-DF and Goiânia. 
In the present study we assume that the tax structure is common to all individuals. We also 
restrict our initial analysis to Sao Paulo households. The welfare analysis associated with the 
alternative optimal commodity tax structures presented in previous sections is simulated for 587 
household observations sampled from a population of more than 8,200,000 individuals.
5 The 
household sample is disaggregated in 40 per-capita expenditure classes (2.5 percent quantiles). 
Therefore, equivalent variations are calculated for each of these 40 total expenditure classes. 
 
5. Results 
Given the estimates of AIDS parameters and the equivalent variation calculation we present 
the results regarding welfare effects on consumers for the specified optimal tax structures 
combined with the different income transfers schemes It is important to point out that positive 
values of EV (or EV/y0) mean a gain in household’s welfare from the tax change. Figures I, II, 
III, IV and V report the welfare effects for all the five cases regarding the alternative tax 
systems, presenting the EV/y0   ratio, for ε = 0.25 and ε = 2.00. 
One important feature presented in all figures is that, except for case II, the ratio EV/y0 
remains quite stable along household expenditure classes (quantiles), for ε = 0.25. This is an 
expected result because as it is shown in tables II and III of section 3 and table IV of section 4 
there is a movement towards uniformity in commodity tax rates for low values of inequality 
aversion parameter (specifically, in cases I, IV and V). Therefore an equal proportional increase 
in all prices has no redistribution effect since there is an equal proportional reduction in real 
incomes for all households. 
As our main concern is on the distributional impact on households welfare we focus on the 
equivalent variations ratios for the higher value of inequality aversion, ε = 2.00. It can be seen in 
all figures that the ratio EV/y0 is positive for the lowest expenditure quantiles, a result that 
presents a welfare improvement through the optimal tax systems for these expenditure classes. 
Figure I presents the equivalent variation rates based on an optimal tax structure without 
income transfers to households (case I). We can see in this figure that the welfare gain for the 
lowest expenditure quantiles (less than 5% of original expenditure) is the lowest among all 
cases. Therefore, the inclusion of a minimum income policy associated with income transfers is 
extremely important for the welfare improvement of lower income households. Except for 
figure I, all figures represents a combination of optimal commodity taxation with some kind of 
minimum program policy. 
                                                 
5 This population correspond to households earning from 1 to 40 minimum wages (total household 
income).   12 
The results in Figure II, regarding case II – optimal tax rates and unconstrained optimal lump 
sum, show a highest welfare gain for the lower income households among all the alternative tax-
benefit systems. The highest EV/y0 ratio is near 400% of original expenditure. However, the 
higher income households incur the highest losses (a negative EV/y0 ratio) in comparison to the 
other figures. As it is shown in table I (section 3), the optimal lump sum transfers obtained in 
this case are extremely high. Although commodity tax rates are also high and present a 
regressive nature in its structure, the strikingly high levels of optimal transfers can be the main 
explanation for such a remarkably welfare gain in comparison to the others tax systems.  
Figure III presents the EV/y0 ratios regarding case III – optimal tax rates combined with a 
constraint in the optimal lump sum transfer. The results shown in figure III are similar in 
structure to those presented in figure II.  However, as we are constraining income transfers to all 
households, welfare gains are lower than those shown in figure II. The highest gain accruing to 
low income households corresponds to a figure slightly above 40% of the original expenditure. 
Figure IV show the results based on the minimum income policy that guarantees a per-capita 
income for the lower households. The highest welfare gain for this program is close to the one 
obtained in figure III (more than 40% of original expenditure). However, the very low 
expenditure quantiles present a welfare gain less than this rate. 
The results for the school stipend program (‘Bolsa-Escola’) are presented in Figure V. We 
note that there are fewer households who effectively benefit from this program as compared to 
the other minimum income programs we have shown. This is explained by the fact that the 
population eligible for the ‘Bolsa-Escola’ is smaller than the other three minimum income 
programs.
6 This fact appears also in figure IV, the minimum income policy that guarantees 50% 
of minimum wage to the lower income households. In the last case, the minimum program also 
restricts the target population. The results shown in Figure VI are quite similar to the ones in 
Figure I, where no transfer is made. As regards the household welfare impact with the increase 
in the income benefit (we double it), we found an increase in the EV/y0 ratios, which indicates 
an improvement in welfare gain for the lower income households. This result is presented in 
Figure VI. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the distributional effects of optimal commodity 
taxation combined with cash transfer programs in Brazil. Our analysis is restricted to a partial 
equilibrium treatment and focuses on the effects of alternative optimal commodity tax-benefit 
systems on the economic welfare of households in different income strata. 
Preferences and household demand patterns used in our welfare impact simulations are based 
on a complete demand system estimated with a flexible functional form, the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (by Deaton and Muellbauer [1980]). Preference parameters estimates are 
consistent with microeconomic demand theory and allow for an accurate evaluation of the 
simulated gain and losses of households welfare. As stressed by Creedy (1999, p.56): “the 
fundamental requirement of any detailed analysis of welfare changes is a suitable consumer 
demand model, along with empirical estimates of the required demand functions.” 
                                                 
6 It is worth reminding that the main targets of this kind of program may be outside our restricted 
population, since we have performed a lower bound income truncation for the sake of the demand 
estimation and we are simulating results only for São Paulo, the wealthiest State of Brazil, so the 
coverage of the program in the real world is expected to be much higher. On the other hand, extending the 
simulation to the households with total income below one minimum wage will not take into account the 
difference on consumption behavior (self-consumption, donations, etc), which are heavily present in these 
segments.    13 
Our results show that under the proposed optimal commodity tax systems combined with 
minimum income programs the welfare gains on low income households are higher in 
comparison to the situation in which the government gives no income transfers to households. 
These results indicate that minimum income programs combined with selectiveness in 
commodity tax structure (with subsidies in food and housing) would be useful as redistribution 
instrument among households. 
 
More specifically, the ‘Bolsa-Escola’ simulations can be of help in the debate on the need of 
a general expansion of education to reduce poverty and inequality in Brazil. Barros, Henriques 
and Mendonça (2000) found out that 40% of overall inequality in the Brazilian personal 
distribution of income could be ascribed to education. In a recent study, Ferreira and Leite 
(2002) present some results of a micro-simulation exercise for the State of Ceará. They suggest 
that broad-based policies aimed at increasing educational attainment would have substantial 
impacts on poverty reduction, but muted effects on inequality. 
 
Some final remarks should be stressed. Our results focus on detailed comparisons of the 
equivalent variations resulting from alternative optimal tax-benefit systems. No attempt was 
made to produce an overall summary measure. Social evaluations of the tax-benefits systems are 
certainly a useful extension and can be made using a specified social welfare function, 
expressed in terms of the distribution of equivalent incomes. The inclusion of labor supply in 
our model would be also desirable to examine the labor supply responses of individuals, as well 
as the impact of the alternative reforms on the households’ welfare. 
Nevertheless, we believe that our empirical findings provide a valuable contribution in the 
context of the increasing discussion about minimum income programs and the current tax policy 
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